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ABSTRACT  
SYDNEY ELIZABETH GREEN 
The Israeli Druze: “Neither Here Nor There”  
(Under the direction of Dr. Vivian Ibrahim)  
Druze scholar Rabah Halabi describes the Druze standing in Israel as “neither here 
nor there.” This thesis asks the question:  How do the Druze fit into a society created 
to house and defend the Jewish people? To answer this question, Druze identity is 
examined from the Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Israeli perspectives regarding the Druze 
community based on their service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) through a case 
study of media reactions to the July 2017 fatal shooting of two on-duty Druze 
policemen by three Arab-Israeli shooters at Islamic holy site al-Aqsa Mosque in the 
Old City in Jerusalem. Three preliminary questions are explored to preface the case 
study:  Who are the Israeli Druze? What is the IDF? and What is the Druze role in the 
IDF? Analysis of Jewish-Israeli media and Arab-Israeli media of reactions to the fatal 
shooting confirms Halabi’s conclusion, reflecting the indifference both sides feel 
toward the Druze community. Because Arabs living inside the borders of Israel 
sympathize so closely with Palestinians, Arab-Israelis feel a similar sense of 
detachment from the Druze, even though they are all Arabs, a link that was forcefully 
removed from memory through Israel’s divide-and-rule policy. The Israelis succeeded 
in their attempt to break the non-Jewish minority into even smaller groups. They 
further succeeded by turning those minorities against one another and ensured that 
relations between the Arab-Israeli and Druze minorities were so hostile that the two 
groups never would unite to fight against the Jews and the State of Israel. Arab-Israeli 
media articles’ use of the word “martyr” to describe only the three Arab-Israeli 
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shooters and not the fallen Druze policemen demonstrates Arab-Israelis’ sentiments 
toward the the Druze population. The Arab-Israeli shooters were martyrs because they 
were defending their Arab brethren from the tyranny of Israel. The Druze are not 
because, like the Jews, they are the enemy. Stuck in the middle of the larger 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Druze are “neither here nor there” in Israeli society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
       I spent the summer of 2017 immersed in a community I was completely 
unfamiliar with prior to my summer experience. This community is the Druze of 
Daliyat al-Carmel, a village on Carmel Mountain a few miles southeast of Haifa, 
Israel. My interest in the Druze community developed over the summer as I 
observed individuals’ earnest loyalty to Israel, lack of empathy for Palestinians and 
apparent disconnect from Arab-Israelis. The Druze are Arabs by ethnicity, yet their 
allegiance lies with the state of Israel. Since 1956, the Druze men in Israel have 
been required to serve in Israel’s national army the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as 
a part of the nation’s mandatory conscription law, giving them a common 
experience with other Israelis who are also required to serve in the IDF for two to 
three years (depending on one’s sex) after turning 18. Service in the IDF requires 
the Druze to fight against Arabs in Palestine who some Druze consider to be their 
brothers. Other Druze, however, reject their Arab heritage and claim Druze or 
Israeli as their main identity.  
       Unlike most Israelis, the Druze are not Jewish but are a part of a religious 
minority with early roots in Islam, which begs the question that this thesis seeks to 
answer:  How do the Druze fit into a society created to house and defend the 
Jewish people? Israel lacks an official constitution, but its Proclamation of 
Independence declares that the “Jewish State” is a place for “Jewish people to be 
masters of their own fate[…] in their own sovereign nation,” (Proclamation, 1948). 
Though the Proclamation makes mention of minority groups and their equal right 
to citizenship, the nation’s intentions are clear:  Israel aims to provide a safe 
community in which the Jewish people will thrive. The Proclamation’s promises 
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“to guarantee freedom of religion” and “ensure complete equality of social and 
political rights to all of its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex,” veil the 
nation’s true intentions of offering preferential treatment to its Jewish citizens, 
(Proclamation, 1948). The vast majority of inhabitants of Israel’s 1967 lines, 
approximately 81%, self-identify as Jewish, (Pew, 2016).  Many questions arise 
from the unique paradox of Druze service to a Jewish state, and this thesis seeks to 
examine the place of the Druze community in Israel. The crux of this work is a 
case study of media articles that reflect Jewish and Arab-Israeli responses to the 
fatal shooting of two Druze police officers at an Islamic holy site in Jerusalem by 
three Arab-Israeli shooters from Northern Israel.  
       The thesis begins with a brief history of the Druze in general and the Israeli 
Druze in specific to provide a better understanding of the niche community. 
Existing literature regarding the identity of Israeli Druze is used to establish a 
framework of their identity before diving into Druze identity as perceived by their 
surrounding populations. As scholars Baumeister and Muraven write, “identity is a 
set of meaningful definitions that are ascribed or attached to the self,” developed 
through “adaptation” for population groups to succeed in their environment 
(Baumeister et al., 1996). This sink-or-swim mentality is demonstrated in the 
Druze community by its compliance with the mandatory conscription law and their 
pragmatic willingness to adopt the Hebrew language in addition to their mother 
tongue Arabic. The Druze are a part of a religious minority and are originally from 
Egypt. The religion emerged from Islam in the early 11th century and welcomed 
anyone to join until they stopped accepting converts a little less than 50 years later 
in about 1050 AD (Hitti, 1996). Though Druze participation in the Arab-Israeli 
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conflict in the years leading up to 1948 is disputed, it appears the Druze were 
neutral until they made an agreement to ally with the Jews in 1948 (Aboulatif, 
2015; Halabi, 2014). Druze scholar from Daliyat al-Carmel Rabah Halabi is not 
alone in believing that this decision sealed their fate and was the foundation for the 
development of the Druze’s unique identity (Halabi, 2014). Israel systematically 
separated the Druze from the other Arabs in the area by including them in 
mandatory conscription and developing a separate education system for Druze 
children in which the government sought to inspire national pride and allegiance to 
the Jews by teaching the similarities between the Druze and Jewish people of Israel 
and dissimilarities between them and, to quote Halabi, the “other Arabs,” (Halabi, 
2014). Israel even changed the legal description of Druze nationality presented on 
birth certificates and identification cards from “Arab” to “Druze,” essentially 
creating a Druze nation (Halabi, 2014). 
       The thesis next answers the question: What is the IDF? Though Israel’s 
military has earlier roots in the paramilitary group known as Haganah, the Israel 
Defense Forces, itself, was founded in 1948, and the Defense Service Law of 1949 
initiated Israel’s conscription law (Hofnung, 1995). The Druze population was 
added to the mandatory conscription law in 1956 for disputed reasons. Some 
sources claim that the decision was an effort to include the Druze community in the 
practice of the majority, while others believe Israel seeks to manipulate the Druze 
by forcing them to risk their lives in the military without adjusting its stance on the 
purpose of the State of Israel. These competing narratives are discussed later at 
length. The IDF aims to protect the State of Israel and “thwart all enemy efforts to 
disrupt the normal way of life in Israel,” which indicates no intention to care for 
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the needs of the Druze. As a minority group that makes up just 2% of Israel’s 
population and occupies secluded villages such as those on Mt. Carmel in the Haifa 
district, the Druze share no part in “the normal way of life in Israel.” The Pew 
Research Center reports that 83% of Druze disclosed that “all or most of their close 
friends belong to [the Druze] community,” (Pew, 2016). The IDF is an entity 
created to protect Jewish people and Jewish life by preserving Israel as a “home for 
the Jewish people,” (IDF Ethics online October 10, 2017). 
       The IDF claims that one of its main goals is to protect the Jewish state, so the 
logical question is: Where do Druze Israelis fit into this narrative? This question 
can be split into two questions: 1) Why were Druze Israelis first included in 
mandatory conscription? and 2) What part do they play in the IDF and why? 
Hofnung argues that Israel decided to include the Druze in mandatory conscription 
because they wanted to prevent discrimination against the Druze for not having 
served in the army (Hofnung, 1995). Others say that the Israelis see the Druze as 
expendable labor to be dispensed against the Palestinians (Aboulatif, 2015). 
Regarding the second question, the Druze soldiers served only in their own special 
unit Herev, also called the Sword Battalion, until 1972 when they finally were 
allowed to disperse among all of the other soldiers (Hofnung, 1995). Service in the 
IDF is seen as a right of passage for Israeli youth and a necessary sacrifice if one 
wishes to reap the full benefits of Israeli citizenship (Halabi, 2014). Participation in 
the IDF opens the door to numerous military benefits and has had a huge impact on 
the economy and unemployment rate in Druze villages in Israel. Other Arabs, 
though, can join the IDF through voluntary service only. 
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       The essay culminates in a case study of the 2017 shooting of two Druze police 
officers in Jerusalem. After completing three years of mandatory service in the IDF, 
many Druze soldiers opt to continue serving in the IDF, while others are recruited 
by the police. Police work can be a dangerous occupation, and two members of the 
Druze community experienced the full capacity of this reality. In July of 2017 two 
Druze police officers stationed near the Lions’ Gate at al-Aqsa mosque were killed 
in the line of duty by three Arab shooters from Umm al-Fahm, a predominantly 
Arab city in Northern Israel near Haifa, who had smuggled makeshift automatic 
weapons, a pistol and a knife into the holy site. The shooting of the two Druze 
police officers was followed by a shootout between Israeli police and the gunmen 
and resulted in the deaths of two Israeli policemen and all three gunmen and the 
injury of another policeman. Located in the heavily politicized Old City in 
Jerusalem, al-Aqsa mosque is considered Islam’s third holiest site following the 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The al-Aqsa mosque attack provoked a wide 
range of reactions and incited political and violent retaliations. The Israeli 
government responded by cancelling Friday prayers at al-Aqsa mosque for the first 
time in 17 years. This incident serves as an effective case because it sparked many 
discussions about the Druze community—a group that does not frequently receive 
national media attention. To further examine Israelis’ and Palestinians’ opinion of 
the Druze, the thesis examines both sides’ popular responses to the shooting by 
analyzing media reports following the event. Some Druze Israelis report that they 
have been called “traitors” by Palestinians and Arabs in Israel, while Israelis 
supposedly treat Druze and other Israeli soldiers equally. The case study compares 
and contrasts newspaper articles from Jewish and Arabic sources to develop a 
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general consensus of the two sides’ opinions on the Druze in Israel through their 
reactions to the two fallen Druze officers. 
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FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY 
Framework 
       This analysis must be framed within a discussion of the Israeli state and the 
non-Jewish minority structure within the nation. Jewish and Arab populations in 
the area experienced a major paradigm shift in 1948 at Israel’s founding when the 
minority became the majority and vice versa. The Jews had claimed a land for 
themselves that celebrated a Jewish population majority. The State of Israel was 
founded upon contested land in 1948, and Palestinians and Arab-Israelis have yet 
to cease resisting the foundation of this new nation. When Israel declared 
nationhood, many Palestinians who had been living in a sovereign nation of their 
own found themselves stuck in the new Jewish nation Israel. Faced with the 
decision to continue resisting or submit to those who they considered invaders by 
becoming Arab-Israelis, some Palestinians chose to continue the resistance 
movement and others, largely members of the so-called “Moderate Camp,” chose a 
practical approach, adopting the title Arab-Israeli. They chose to focus on uplifting 
Israel’s Arab population by contributing to the civic needs of their communities 
rather than resistance mobilization, (Rekhless, 2007). Israel has constructed its 
nation in such a way that there is a clear division between Jewish and non-Jewish 
citizens, a phenomenon exemplified through its conscription laws that determine 
who must serve in the military based primarily on his or her religious affiliation 
and secondarily on one’s ethnic origin. They have used the Defense Service Law as 
a tool to enforce its “divide-and-rule” policy. In the 1930s, Jewish leaders gathered 
to discuss tactics to suppress the Arab rebels and secure a future nation for 
themselves. They devised a council to manage such affairs, and it determined that 
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the best strategy would be to subdivide the minority communities to prevent 
alliance against the Jews (Gelber, 1995). To do so, Israeli government made 
calculated efforts to place a wedge between the Druze and the rest of the Arab 
population.  
       Broadly, all Israeli Jews and all male Druze are subject to mandatory 
conscription. Arab-Israelis living inside Israel’s 1967 borders, on the other hand, 
are not. They are permitted to serve voluntarily, but the Israeli government 
intentionally excluded them from mandatory participation in Israel’s security 
forces (Hofnung, 1995). This tangible example of Israel’s majority-minority 
premise offers an insightful framework through which to examine Israeli Druze 
identity. Mandatory conscription is a tool for developing unity, loyalty and 
nationalism, and it plays a powerful role in the development of identity, both 
personal and externally perceived (Hofnung, 1995). Conscription laws have been 
implemented throughout history for a number of reasons as direct as quickly 
building up a strong military and as complex as strategically selecting specific 
groups of people to include (and exclude) in the development of national identity 
and nationalism, which is the case in Israel (Aboulatif, 2015). Halabi writes that 
Druze identity is “constructed as a direct result of policies and expectations of 
members and institutions of majority groups” (Halabi, 2014). He describes the 
disconnect that the Druze community feels from both Arab-Israelis and Jews as 
being in limbo, “neither here nor there.” Halabi has described the Druze as a 
“minority within a minority,” but this concept can be taken a step further (Halabi, 
2014 pp 268). More accurately, they are a “minority within a minority within a 
minority.”  
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       Those within the Druze community were popularly labeled by Jewish 
politicians and leaders as “negative forces” or “positive forces,” those who hinder 
the state’s progress or those who adapt to the Jews’ plans for the Druze (Firro, 
2001). Jewish leaders decided to shape Druze politics by rewarding good behavior 
by cooperating with “positive forces” and punishing bad behavior by refusing to 
negotiate with “negative forces,” (Firro, 2001). Druze leaders who were considered 
“positive forces” were called upon to assist Israel with its struggle against the 
Arabs in the late 1930s. Publicly, the Druze remained neutral to the cause until it 
was safe for them to more officially declare allegiance to the Jews at the close of 
the 1948 war. This is an oversimplification of the history, but even those who chose 
to side with the Arabs did so only temporarily and did not represent the majority. 
Israel convinced Druze leaders that it was in their best interest for their two 
minority groups to ally. Druze who opposed this proposition were labelled 
“negative forces,” while those who acquiesced were considered “positive forces” 
and became delegates to encourage the rest of their community to join the Jewish 
cause. Jews initially scouted the Druze because they were fellow minority 
populations in a tense environment. Before the Jews became the state majority in 
1948, a Jewish-Druze alliance was mutually beneficial because it strengthened the 
fight against Palestinians and other Arabs prior to the Arab-Israeli War. 
       Key to understanding this thesis is knowing that the Druze communities in 
each nation vary, and those residing in Israel are especially distinct. The Druze 
community as a whole is a unique group, but the Druze community in Israel is 
even more specialized because of the efforts that the Israeli government has 
exerted to intentionally mold them into the type of Israeli citizens they want the 
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Druze to be. By reinforcing the Druze’s wanted behaviors, such as loyalty to Israel 
and the Jewish cause, Israel intensified the power rendered through its divide-and-
rule policies. Central to this concept is the Druze tradition of taqiyya, or 
“dissimulation,” (Firro, 2001 pp 47). Because the Druze have experienced extreme 
religious persecution since the religion’s founding, the religion permits the Druze 
to adapt to their surroundings for their own protection. Though outsiders have 
misconstrued the particularities of this concept, it was vital to the Israeli 
government’s strategic approach to develop policies directed at the Druze. Israeli 
scholar Haim Blanc developed a report of their “behavioral patterns” that primarily 
was established through the lens of taqiyya (Firro, 2001). The Druze’s willingness 
to adapt to survive gave Israel a powerful tool to manipulate its Druze population. 
Methodology 
       The Israeli Druze in this thesis are referred to simply as “Druze,” and the 
reader should remember that the analyses and assertions here refer only to the 
Druze living in Israel, not in the Golan or the West Bank or any other area outside 
of Israel. Arabs living in Israel, the non-Druze Arab populations residing in the 
State of Israel, are referred to as “Arab-Israelis.” Those living in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip are referred to as “Palestinians.” This is an oversimplification of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict at large because many Arabs living inside the 1967 
borders self-identify as Palestinian, but this terminology is the clearest and simplest 
way to refer to these populations in relation to analysis of Druze identity. Israel 
refers to the Green Line or 1967 borders that were recognized from the 1949 
Armistice Agreements until the Six-Day War in 1967. This territory excludes the 
Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. 
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       The theoretical frameworks employed focus on the minority relationships 
developed by Israel, and these distinctions are exemplified through Israel’s 
Defense Service Law that determines who is mandated to serve in the IDF. The 
IDF, in a sense, has become one of Israel’s biggest cultural connectors. As an 
institution created by and for the majority people, it has a strong hold on the nation 
as a whole and a big impact on the minority groups. For this reason the IDF, its 
mission and Druze participation in the service are central to this thesis. For many 
soldiers, especially the Druze, the IDF serves as a pipeline to Israel’s security 
services, which include the police and border patrol. Because of the personnel 
overlap between the IDF and the post-service security forces, these institutions are 
perceived as extensions of the IDF. This phenomenon explains the relevance of the 
case study involving the deaths of two Druze police officers in Jerusalem. 
Comparison and contrast of the Arab and Jewish responses to the shootings 
conclude this thesis. Palestinian sources from Gaza are included because the beliefs 
of Palestinians fall closely in line with those of many Arab-Israelis due to the 
unique nationalistic conflict in Israel and Palestine that causes some Arabs living in 
Israel to identify as Palestinian rather than Israeli.  
       The case study employs analysis of the most-circulated newspapers from both 
Arabic and Jewish media. A total of six media articles--three Arabic and three 
Jewish--are cited from different news sources. The Arabic-language news sources 
employed will be called “Arabic” media regardless of whether the sources 
originate in Palestine (West Bank or Gaza Strip) or in Israel. Other sources will be 
referred to as “Jewish” media, as to demonstrate that they represent the “majority,” 
Israeli opinion. Three sources from each side are compared and contrasted, and 
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neutral article from British media outlet The Guardian is used as an example of 
non-biased reporting. Though it is impossible to actually report without bias, the 
U.S. article comes close to meeting this goal. The Guardian article lays a baseline 
to demonstrate where the Israeli and Palestinian articles stray from factual 
reporting. 
       Israeli news sources are translated by the news source itself or a third party 
from Hebrew to English and include Israel Hayom or “The Times of Israel,” a 
relatively new, conservative, U.S.-owned source that has the largest daily 
circulation in Israel; Haaretz or “The Land,” Israel’s oldest newspaper; and news 
articles from the website of Israel’s largest non-governmental organization Keren 
Kayemeth LeIsrael – Jewish National Fund (KKL-JNF) that was originally 
founded in 1901 as the Jewish National Fund, which bought land from Arabs in 
Palestine and sold it to Jewish immigrants for little profit in an effort to promote 
Jewish settlement in the area.  
       Palestinian news sources are written in Arabic and interpreted by me with the 
help of Dr. Luca D’Anna. They include news articles from al-Jazeera, al-Quds and 
al-Hadath. Al-Jazeera, or The Island in English, is a popular international media 
source rooted in the Arab world. Al-Quds, or Jerusalem, was founded in 1951 in 
East Jerusalem, and now the newspaper has the largest circulation in Palestine. 
Though it is privately owned, it has ties to the Palestinian Authority. Al-Hadath, or 
The Event, is an Arabic weekly newspaper in Amman, Jordan. It is included 
because Palestinians have a huge presence in Jordan and the online reporting 
resources from inside Palestine are limited. 
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       Through defining Druze history and exploring Israel’s policies, this thesis 
analyzes the impact that these issues have on Druze relations today and how that 
informs Arabs and Jews perceptions of them. The examination of Israel’s 
mandatory conscription policies and the IDF code of ethics and mission statement 
formulate a large portion of the conclusions found in this thesis while the other part 
is advised by the case study. Analysis of Arabic and Jewish media responses to the 
killing of two Druze police officers serves as tangible evidence of other Israelis’ 
perception of their fellow Druze citizens. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Israeli Druze 
       After the larger Druze community fragmented and individual communities 
descended from the mountains in the Greater Syria region approximately 350 years 
ago, the groups dispersed themselves and settled in the surrounding area. The 
Druze evolved into a less homogenous group when they settled in different nations 
throughout the region. Perhaps through the Druze tradition of taqiyya, each 
community became loyal to the nations in which they resided. Many of them have 
made their new homes in what is now considered the Northern District or, more 
specifically, the Haifa, Akko and Kinneret sub-districts of Israel. According to 
Israel’s CBS, these sub-districts are home to 91.4% of Israel’s Druze population, 
and with a few exceptions, the populations of most of the villages in this area are 
more than 99% Druze, (CBS, 2005). Since the Jews’ victory in 1948, the Druze 
have been considered an ally of the Jews, and they even serve in Israel’s national 
army. Many Druze feel a sense of detachment from their Arab heritage and self-
identify as Israelis; however, the Druze have little in common with the majority of 
Israelis who all share a cultural connection through Judaism (Halabi, 2014). 
Through their inclusion in the mandatory conscription law, though, Israel’s Druze 
population is placed in a unique position in which they are able to share in majority 
Israeli culture without actually being a part of that majority, a position scholar 
Rabah Halabi of Druze village Daliyat al-Carmel calls “neither here nor 
there,” (Halabi, 2014). 
Location 
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       The Institute of Druze Studies estimates that there are about one million 
Druze, with the majority living in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan. Six to seven 
percent of the total Druze population resides in Israel (IDS April 12, 2018). 
According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, there are 
approximately 130,000 Druze living in Israel, composing roughly 2% of Israel’s 
population (Pew, 2016). The majority of Israel’s Druze reside in the North on Mt. 
Carmel outside of Haifa, in the Galilee region and in the occupied Golan Heights. 
According to the CBS, about 8.6% of Israel’s total Druze population live in the 
occupied Golan Heights, a region whose ownership has been contested since the 
release of UN Resolution 242 that sought to make peaceful settlements for the 
disputed lands claimed in the Six-Day War in 1967 (CBS, 2005). Syrian citizens 
still compose the majority of the disputed territory, and some Druze in the Golan 
refuse Israeli citizenship because they still consider themselves Syrian. The Golani 
Druze are excluded from analysis because many of those in the occupied Golan 
Heights hold starkly different opinions, which upholds the notion that the Druze 
are nationalistic.  
History 
       Druzism dates back to the year 1017 in Egypt under the leader Caliph al-
Hakim who was a central part of the religion’s development. He later came to 
recognize the religion nationally and began to promote religious freedom, an 
important liberty for followers of such a small religious minority (Aridi September 
10, 2017). The religion originated from a subgroup of the Shia sect of Islam called 
Ismailism, and the founder of Druzism, along with al-Hakim, was an Ismaili 
scholar named Hamza ibn Ali ibn Ahmad. The name Druze is a derivative of 
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Hamza’s apprentice Mohammad ad-Darazi, who ironically turned against the 
religion sometime after it became his namesake (Hitti, 1996). In contrast to popular 
belief, however, Druzism is not a sect of Islam but is its own religion. After 
separating from Ismailism, the religion combined elements of Judaism and 
Christianity and was influenced by Greek philosophy and Gnosticism. Like the 
religions from which it is derived, Druzism is monotheistic. The other main tenet 
of Druzism is belief in reincarnation (Halabi, 2014). The religion closed to 
converts in the year 1043, and proselytization has been forbidden ever since (Aridi 
September 10, 2017). This explains the small size of the Druze community 
worldwide. Though al-Hakim afforded the Druze the right to practice their religion 
during his rule, the Druze have experienced persecution from surrounding majority 
religions throughout history. Their historical adherence to taqiyya allows them to 
assimilate to the majority and hide their true beliefs and quell their religious 
identity to avoid conflict. 
       Perhaps because proselytization is forbidden, the Druze religion is shrouded in 
secret, and few people, including some Druze themselves, know the specifics of 
the religion. Many non-devout Druze know very little about the religion, yet they 
are still a part of the community because being Druze is about much more than the 
religion. Even though few Druze identify as devout, a survey conducted by Pew 
shows that 72% of Druze in Israel say being Druze is “very important” to them, 
(Pew, 2016). Religion is but a part of what it means to be Druze. Describing what it 
means to be Druze is difficult, and Halabi’s interviews of 50 Israeli Druze shows 
that some associate being Druze with culture, some see it in a “social sense” and 
others view it as a “lifestyle,” (Halabi, 2014). Ancestry seems to be the root of their 
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community. Because conversion to Druzism is impossible, Druze living now are 
direct descendants of the original Druze community. Pew reports that only 1% of 
married Druze say that their partner is non-Druze or non-religious, and they are 
“strongly opposed” to intermarriage, (Pew, 2016). Though there are a few cases of 
inter-marriage, marrying someone outside of the religion is forbidden in Druzism 
and typically results in expulsion from the community.  
Taqiyya and the Jewish-Druze Alliance 
       As stated, the Druze compose a meager 2% of Israel’s total population. By law, 
the Druze are defined as “Arab,” like most other non-Jewish Israeli inhabitants.are 
also classified as “Arab,” but, under Israel’s divide-and-rule policy, this group is 
subdivided into Bedouin or Bedu, Circassian, Druze and Muslim. Laws like 
Israel’s Defense Service Law impact each of these groups differently. Throughout 
the pre-Israel Palestinian-Jewish conflict, the Druze in the region were largely 
neutral toward the issue. However, when forced to choose, Druze leaders chose the 
side of the Jews (Aridi September 10, 2017). In 1930, Jewish leaders (and future 
Israeli politicians) devised a special council of members of the Jewish Agency and 
the Jewish National Council called the Joint Bureau for Arab Affairs to determine 
how to manage affairs with the Arab rebels (Gelber, 352). In the Joint Bureau’s 
attempt to manage the Arab community and prevent mass insurgence, discussions 
of a potential  Jewish-Druze alliance commenced. They quickly discovered the 
Galilee Druze’s potential to serve the State and ally with the Jews and began 
manipulating the community to launch that potential alliance. After Israeli scholar 
Blanc presented the Joint Bureau with his analysis of Druze behavior, Jewish 
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leaders became aware of the taqiyya principle and sought to use it as an alliance 
tool (Firro, 2001).  
       The relationship began with a gesture of goodwill on the part of the Jews. In 
July 1930 a Druze man murdered an Arab policeman, instigating the majority-Arab 
police force’s violent retaliation against the village in which he resided. Druze 
delegates travelled to Jerusalem, seeking assistance from the Joint Bureau and, 
though the Joint Bureau provided no tangible assistance at that time, the Druze 
were grateful to them. A Joint Bureau member wrote to a leader in the Jewish 
Agency, stating, “It is worthwhile to gain their friendship…” and that the Druze 
delegates “believe that [the Joint Bureau’s and the Druze’s] fraternity will grow 
further,” (Gelber, 1995). Words like “fraternity” and “brotherhood” are frequently 
used to describe the relationship between the Jews and the Druze. The Joint 
Bureau, and eventually Israel, capitalized on the informal alliance and pursued 
further relations with the Druze. This was strategically beneficial to both sides, but 
especially to the Jews. Prior to 1948, they were the minority in a hostile 
environment surrounded by enemies, and allying with another minority group had 
great strategic benefit for the Jews. The Druze, however, were not at the same risk 
of persecution and violence. It is unclear exactly why the Druze initially chose to 
actively cooperate, but they could sense the potential benefits of a Jewish-Druze 
alliance. Additionally, they were living on land that was in the middle of the 
Palestinian-Jewish conflict. Their livelihoods would be impacted by the outcome of 
the ongoing conflict if their land was divided and given to other states to manage, 
like other parts of Palestine and Syria in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence.  
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       Taqiyya allowed, perhaps even encouraged, the Druze to ally with the Jews. 
Because the Jews and the Druze were both minority communities, the Druze could 
not publicly support the Jews or advertise that they were cooperating with the Joint 
Bureau. That would have put the Druze community at great risk of attack by Arab 
rebels. In 1948, though, this changed. When Israel was founded, the Jews shifted 
from minority to majority in their new territory, and the Arabs became the minority 
at risk of persecution. At this time, the Druze felt it was safe to announce their 
commitment to the Jewish people. When Israel was founded the Jewish minority 
became the majority, and Arabs shifted from majority to minority. Only 160,000 
Arabs remained within the borders of Israel by 1949 (Cleveland, 1986). Outsiders’ 
understanding of taqiyya and what it means to the Druze community is very 
limited, but the principle of taqiyya as outsiders understand it fits smoothly into 
this narrative. The Druze use taqiyya as a an assimilation strategy that safeguards 
their community from persecution. A public Jewish-Druze alliance only came to 
fall under taqiyya when the Jews became the majority population in their territory.  
The Druze commitment to the Jewish people is now termed the “Covenant of 
Blood” (Nisan, 2010). The Jewish-Druze relationship is founded on a handshake 
and a promise of fraternity. This lack of clarity leaves the Druze community in the 
peculiar situation they are in now, tangled in a web of Arab and Druze and Israeli 
identities.  
Druze as a Nationality 
       Druze scholar Rabah Halabi states, citing the 2012 Central Bureau of 
Statistics, all of the approximately 120,000 Druze living in Israel today are 
“original residents of Palestine,” (Halabi, 2014 pp. 268). In 1957 the Israeli 
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government deemed the Druze a distinct ethnic minority upon request of its 
leaders. Since that time, Druze birth certificates and driver’s licenses state that their 
nationality is Druze, (Halabi, 2014). Clearly, there is no nation of the Druze, so this 
decision is peculiar. One explanation is that Israelis did this to strategically 
separate the Druze from the Arabs as a tool to further triumph over the Arab 
minority. The Druze have a separate school system and curriculum that includes 
the history of the Jewish-Druze relationship in Israel. It teaches young school 
children that they are brothers with the Jews of Israel. The kinship taught in school 
urges children to be loyal to the State of Israel and the Jewish cause. Some Druze 
are even eager to uphold their end of the Covenant by serving in Israel’s military 
(Halabi, 2014). 
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CHAPTER 2 
The IDF:  Preserving the “normal way of life in Israel” 
       Rampant anti-semitism throughout Europe beginning in the nineteenth century 
forced Jews to flee their homes. By 1948, more than half a million Jews had sought 
refuge in the historic land they once called home according to statistics published 
by the Jewish Virtual Library (JVL “Aliyah Bet” online April 10, 2018). For nearly 
1,200 years, Arabs had resided in the area and the Jewish community was but a 
small minority in Palestine (Cleveland, 1986). Waves of immigration disrupted the 
status quo in Palestine and sparked a bitter struggle for dominance between the 
Arabs and the incoming Jews. This struggle, complicated by the trainwreck of 
empty promises made by Britain to conflicting parties, soon turned into an 
international source of hostility and violence that sparked major wars between 
Jews and Arabs in the area. War comes with a need for a military--a position that 
the Jews filled with the Haganah, a paramilitary group of devoted Jewish 
immigrants dedicated to fending off Arabs for the sake of the Jewish cause. 
Founded in 1920, the Haganah later developed into Israel’s national military of 
today (Cleveland, 1986). During Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion’s speech 
presenting the bill that introduced mandatory conscription, he stated that the IDF’s 
objective is to “maintain[sic] national independence against any external coercion,” 
(Hofnung, 1995). 
       Though the following is an oversimplification of an extremely complicated 
history, it suits the needs of this paper. Great Britain’s Palestinian Mandate was 
never granted freedom in the way it was supposed to. Britain abandoned its 
mandate with no working government and no consensus between Palestinians and 
!25
Israelis. After Britain’s sloppy exit Israel was founded in 1947 upon the declaration 
of David Ben-Gurion, terms that were controversial and not universally accepted. 
The Israelis’ organization, finances and military far surpassed that of the 
Palestinians, and they continued to assert their dominance and maintain their 
nation. The nation developed a sense of community by uniting over the Jewish 
cause. This major conflict, like most others in the region, excludes the Druze 
community. The Druze had been in Israel for more than 200 years by the time the 
Arab-Israeli conflict emerged, (Halabi, 2014). Yet, the Druze are not a part of the 
popular narrative that describes the two-sided tug of war that was Israel’s 
tumultuous twentieth century. Examining the establishment and development of 
Israel’s national military hints at the status of the Druze in the newly established 
Jewish homeland. 
       Israel wasted little time in building up its military. The roots formed by the 
Haganah grew into the powerful national military known as the Israel Defense 
Forces or IDF. The Defense Service Law initiated mandatory conscription in 1949 
(Defense Service Law, 5746-1986). The law implicates all Israeli citizens including 
non-Jews; however, there are a number of exclusions and exemptions determined 
by nationality, religion and gender. Exemptions include devout Israelis and women 
who are mothers, pregnant or married (Hofnung, 1995). Arabs, Circassians, 
Bedouins and Druze are also exempted but allowed to serve on a voluntary basis 
(Hofnung, 1995). This segmentation is a prime example of Israel’s divide-and-rule 
policy. Not only has Israel subdivided an already meager minority, but it also has 
established a legal division between the Druze and Arab-Israelis. The part of this 
particular exemption regarding the Druze changed quickly, but Arabs were never 
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included in conscription (Hofnung, 1995). Though Arabs may volunteer for the 
IDF, lawmakers determined it unwise to require an unwilling group of people to 
serve, and they also feared the complications that could arise so long as they (the 
Arabs) were the enemy (Hofnung, 1995). For disputed reasons, the Druze were 
written into Israel’s mandatory conscription law seven years later in 1956 upon 
request of Druze leaders. The law implicates only Druze men, as the Knesset 
granted Druze women full exemption from service out of respect for Druze 
tradition and religious convictions. Until the 1970s most Druze soldiers served in a 
special coalition composed mainly of Druze before being integrated into the 
mainstream IDF. The Druze are now dispersed throughout the IDF’s brigades.  
       Like most other national militaries, the IDF was established to protect the 
nation and its people, but this does not detail who its people are. One assumption is 
that it protects everyone who resides in Israel. Examination of the IDF’s mission 
statement and code of ethics, found on an Israeli government website dedicated to 
the IDF, provides a little more clarity. The IDF Mission is as follows:  
To defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state 
of Israel. To protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms of 
terrorism which threaten the daily life. - IDF Mission online, October 
10, 2017 
This mission statement affirms the original assumption that the IDF aims to serve 
all who live in Israel, except perhaps those who pose a threat to the State. The IDF 
Mission does not define what constitutes as a threat, though, and this vague 
language can be used to serve for or against minority populations. However, there 
is much more to the IDF’s core than simply its mission statement. The Mission is 
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supplemented by a code of ethics that includes a proclamation of The Spirit of the 
IDF and an outline of the IDF’s Basic Values that provide more of an explanation. 
The main objective of the IDF is stated as follows in the code of ethics:  
The goal of the IDF is to protect the existence of the State of Israel and 
its independence, and to thwart all enemy efforts to disrupt the normal 
way of life in Israel. - IDF Ethics online October 10, 2017 
This leaves one to wonder “What is the ‘normal way of life in Israel’ and who 
exists outside the norm?” The logical assumption is that the norm is established by 
the majority:  the Jewish people.  
       The code of ethics is much lengthier than the IDF Mission and raises many 
questions as to what and whom the IDF was actually designed to protect. The two 
focus on the State of Israel being a national home for the Jewish people--exclusive 
and controversial rhetoric and colonial meddling which took root in the Balfour 
Declaration in which Great Britain implied it would support establishing a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine. The Spirit of the IDF calls upon soldiers to “...fight, to 
dedicate all their strength and even sacrifice their lives in order to protect the State 
of Israel… as a Jewish and democratic state,” and one of the Spirit’s four founding 
principles is “The tradition of the Jewish people throughout their history,” (IDF 
Ethics online October 10, 2017). The Basic Values express the same sentiments 
designed to evoke nationalism through religion. The Druze are not Jewish and 
therefore do not share the same traditions and do not consider Israel the motherland 
of their religion. This causes one to question what benefits the State of Israel in 
general and the IDF in particular offer to the Druze in exchange for the potentially 
lethal sacrifice of their service.  
!28
Learning more about the origins and the creed of the Israel Defense Forces leaves 
us only with more questions as to why the Druze began serving and continue to 
serve so willingly. So far, little has been explained regarding Palestinians’ and 
Israelis’ perception of their Druze neighbors. We do know, however, that Druze 
participation in IDF service indicates that Israelis trust the Druze’s allegiance to 
Israel far more than they trust the Arabs’. The next chapter discusses the Druze’s 
role in the IDF to discover what the IDF means to the Druze and, inversely, what 
the Druze mean to the IDF and the nation it protects. It also compares Druze 
service to that of the Arabs to further piece together the larger puzzle of Arab-
Israelis’ and Jews’ relationships with the Druze.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Druze Role in the IDF 
       The Druze community is a noticeable asset to Israel in its service to the State 
through the Israel Defense Forces. Though they are but a small minority 
population, the Druze compose a disproportionately large percentage of the IDF.  
Eighty percent of eligible Druze men choose to list, which is higher than the 
national average according to the Times of Israel (May 18, 2015). Druze 
participation began with a small number of volunteers who offered their service to 
Israel following the war of 1948. Their commitment to and participation in the IDF 
has developed substantially over the last several decades, and Druze men now 
serve in almost every part of Israel’s national defense. At the end of their required 
service, many Druze veterans choose to transition into other sectors of Israel’s 
security forces, the unit that the two Druze policemen were serving in (Firro, 
2001). The so-called Covenant of Blood between the Jews and the Druze is alive 
and well in a very literal sense in the Druze’s willingness to die for their country 
and their Jewish brothers.  
       Israel’s Druze population was added to the nation’s mandatory conscription 
law in 1956 upon request of community leaders, seven years after the law was 
instituted for Jewish Israelis in 1949 (Hofnung, 1995). Only Druze men are 
implicated in this law as Druze women are exempted due to religious beliefs that 
forbid women to participate in activities associated with military service. The 
Druze initially served in their own majority-Druze battalion known as the Sword 
Battalion or Herev but were later allowed to assimilate into the IDF at large, 
(Hofnung, 1995). The rationale behind including the Druze in 1956 is unclear. 
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Scholars Menachem Hofnung and Eduardo Wassim Aboulatif offer competing 
narratives. The former asserts that Israel had benevolent intentions in its decision, 
but the latter claims Israel aimed primarily to exploit the labor of a people that 
matters little to the nation. Hofnung argues that, for the Druze, military service is 
essential to the procurement of “material rewards,” such as lower unemployment 
rates and the opportunity to assimilate into majority Israeli culture and society. He 
writes that the compulsory conscription law promotes “collective tolerance and 
coexistence in an ethnically and ideologically divided society,” (Hofnung, 318) It 
is uncertain whether or not this was the actual reason for amending the Defense 
Service Law, but Hofnung raises a valid point. Intentional or not, IDF service has 
brought many benefits to the Druze of Israel. 
       One of the most visible benefits is the sharp decrease in unemployment in 
Israel’s Druze villages, (Hofnung, 1995). These new employees also had the 
opportunity to capitalize on social benefits such as retirement plans. Other benefits 
are less tangible but very important to the Druze psyche. IDF service functions as a 
right of passage for Israeli youth; when the law changed, the Druze community 
was invited into popular Israeli society for the first time. Through the IDF, Druze 
youth share a common experience with other Israeli youth that fosters interaction 
between the two groups and promotes inclusion of the minority community. Halabi 
conducted interviews with many Druze in his community, and one Druze soldier 
stated that he has been looked down upon by Israelis when using public transit 
without wearing his uniform because he looks Arab . When he travels in his IDF 
uniform, however, he has been recognized as a Druze and thanked for his service 
(Halabi, 2014). Examples like this demonstrate the Druze transformation from the 
!31
“other” to fellow citizens through IDF service. If it were not for their fraternization 
with mainstream Israelis in the IDF, the Druze might have remained a complete 
enigma to other Israelis. 
       Druze inclusion in the service indicates Israeli officials’ opinion of the Druze 
community and ability to trust the minority group. Arabs are not afforded that same 
right, and they collectively express disdain for Druze IDF soldiers. Some even 
consider them traitors. Perhaps as important as the Druze position in the IDF is the 
Arabs’ role, or lack thereof. Arabs were originally excluded from the Defense 
Service Law. Unlike the Druze, though, the law never was amended to include 
mandatory service for this population group. They are permitted only to serve 
under voluntary circumstances (Hofnung, 1995). Including the Druze and 
excluding Arabs may serve as the facade for an Israeli scheme to separate Arabs 
from the Druze and other Israelis or simply a practical precautionary measure 
designed to prevent a conflict of loyalties between Arab-Israelis and their close 
Palestinian brothers. Some Druze and Arab-Israelis claim that Druze soldiers are 
placed in areas of higher conflict to ensure intimate battles between the two 
communities. They believe that the Israeli government is using Druze service to 
create friction between the two communities by pitting the Druze against Arab-
Israelis and further isolating them from their Arab heritage. This claim may hold 
merit considering the disproportionate percentage of Druze serving throughout the 
IDF in general and even more so in specific sectors of the service. For example, 
40% of the soldiers serving in the IDF’s border security unit are Druze, (Hofnung, 
1995). Either way, the strategy behind the policy decision to include in mandatory 
conscription Druze and not Arabs is highly political. It perpetuates the calculated 
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block Israel wedged between the Druze and the Arab population that began when 
Israel instituted a separate school system and invented a nationality for its Druze 
community. It also prevents Arabs from participating in Israeli life and reaping the 
benefits of full Israeli citizenship unlocked for the Druze when mandatory 
conscription was introduced to them in 1956.  
       IDF service is one of the few ways in which the Druze can have a typical 
Israeli experience. It draws them down from the secluded villages they spend the 
majority of their lives in, requires them to use Israel’s national language Hebrew 
(rather than their mother tongue Arabic) so they have the option of linguistically 
assimilating into their country, and demonstrates the Druze commitment to Israel 
and their stable commitment to the Covenant. Mandatory conscription for the 
Druze improves their relationship with Israelis by allowing them to become 
acquainted with the Druze through their shared experience. It promotes trust 
between the two groups and gives the Druze a sense of belonging. On the other 
hand, IDF service strains relations between the Druze and Arab-Israelis. Some 
Arab-Israelis hate the Druze for defending their enemy country and others simply 
feel an unwanted sense of detachment from their Arab brethren. The extent to 
which military and security service influences the Druze experience and their 
relationships with the surrounding populations is explored in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Case Study: 2017 Shooting of Two Druze Policemen in the Old City 
       Using various media outlets from Arabic and Jewish resources, this chapter 
examines the responses of these two communities in an attempt to analyze the 
opinions of each side regarding Druze police officers and the Druze community in 
general. Not surprisingly, the responses from Arab-Israelis and Jews differ greatly. 
Beyond the reporting disparities that arise from the hostility between the two 
groups in question, the majority of media articles from both sides express the 
public’s general reaction to the event as a whole and, by omission, reveal the 
indifference with which most Arab-Israelis and Jews regard the Druze community. 
Most articles ignore the victims’ Druze identity and focus instead on the 
repercussions and consequences of the shooting or on praise for the sacrifice these 
two fallen policemen made and the sacrifices of all who defend Israel and its 
people. This chapter compares the portrayals of the attack and analyzes the ways in 
which they are reflective of the larger perceptions of the Druze community.  
The Sources 
       The news articles vary in their reports of the incident in typical he-said/she-
said fashion, differing especially in the portrayal of which group (the shooters from 
Umm al-Fahm or the Druze policemen) was the antagonist. Each side attempts to 
subtly propagate its own political agenda. For that reason, newspapers and articles 
from across the political spectrum are used. It is worth noting that the quality of 
journalism and accessibility to articles of the Jewish sources surpasses that of the 
Arabic ones, perhaps due to laws that restrict production, distribution and content 
of Arabic newspapers. This could also reflect the issue of relativity and 
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newsworthiness. The deaths of Israel’s security forces members may be more 
important to Jews than to Arab-Israelis because the security forces are designed to 
protect the Jewish state.  
       Arabic media sources’ reactions to the attack can be divided into three main 
categories: those who see the deceased Druze soldiers as simply Israelis, as victims 
of the State of Israel or as enemies of the Arab-Israelis and Palestinians. The first 
category of responses ignores that the Druze are a minority community and are not 
a part of the Jewish majority that Arab-Israelis generally oppose. The news articles 
in this group typically focus more on tangential issues, such as the amplified 
security measures at al-Aqsa Mosque added after the attack. Seeing media 
responses that fall in the second category is more rare; the Druze are not frequently 
seen as victims. Not many Arab-Israelis feel sympathy for Druze soldiers in 
general, and that sentiment is carried over into Arab-Israelis’ reactions to this 
particular event. The few sources that do report that the soldiers are victims spin 
the narrative to focus on the hypocrisy of seemingly empathetic Israeli reactions to 
the death of Druze men serving their State, circling back to the common politicized 
rhetoric that opposes Israel and all things Israeli. The third category is most 
common for any sources that looked beyond the Druze’s supposed Israeli identity. 
Many Arab-Israelis view Druze Israelis as a force more threatening than other 
Israelis, a narrative reflected in the media’s reaction to the attack. These articles 
focus on the innocence of the Arab-Israeli attackers, or “martyrs” as this media 
references them, even twisting the facts to present them as innocent. 
       Israeli sources are an example of diplomacy through journalism, either 
by referencing the Israel-Palestine conflict or attempting to remind the Druze that 
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their sacrifice to the State is appreciated. Similar to Arabic media, reporting on the 
fallen Druze police as if they were any other Israeli soldiers is common. These 
media sources react to the Druze as if they were Jews who fight for the same cause 
and suffer the same fate when attacked. These media sources thank them for their 
service and reiterate the sacrifices all Israelis must make for the sake of their 
nation. These sources also represent Israel’s usual political adage that aims to vilify 
the Arab-Israelis and Palestinians and profess the injustices Israelis are said to be 
forced to experience. Few sources examine the Druze soldiers through their own 
identity lens, but those that do delve into the issue deeper simply highlight the 
sacrifice that the Druze men make and reaffirm their supposed commitment to the 
Druze community, a response that is not free of political intent. There are two main 
Israeli responses. The first is similar to the Arab-Israelis’ first response, an analysis 
of the issue that ignores the unique Druze identity. The second focuses on the 
sacrifice the Druze make for Israel and the Covenant of Blood that has existed for 
many years between the Druze and the Jews. 
       The subset of Jewish sources and Arabic sources that address the Druze 
soldiers as victims are the closest the two sides come to seeing eye-to-eye, but 
these, too, are far from congruent. Not only are their intents opposite, but their 
representations of Druze soldiers is different as well. Arabic sources state that the 
Druze are victims because they have been forced into service while Jewish sources 
state that the Druze are victims of Arab aggression. The death of these two Druze 
policemen is used as just another way to advance a political narrative. Even the 
sources that focus on the Druze as a distinct community that makes excessive 
sacrifices to uphold their commitment to Israel are guilty of using this tragedy for 
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political gain. These responses are representative of larger opinion of the Israeli 
Druze. They are a minority group that is expected to participate in Israeli duties, 
such as IDF service, to the same level that all other Israelis are and to make the 
ultimate sacrifice when necessary, even though they do not reap the same benefits 
of typical Israeli life because of their seclusion in small villages high in the hills, 
far from interaction with other Israelis. They are commonly viewed as typical 
Israelis through Arab-Israelis’ eyes, too, meaning that they are despised alongside 
the other Israelis. 
“Martyrs” or “Terrorists” 
       The most notable difference between the Jewish and Arabic sources is the 
language with which the news articles describe the two groups of shooters and the 
event as a whole. The key words employed are “martyr” versus “terrorist” and 
“attack” versus “terrorist attack.” Arabic sources use the terms “martyr” and 
“attack” to describe the Arab-Israeli shooters and the event as a whole, 
respectively. On the other hand, Jewish articles use “terrorist” and “terrorist attack” 
to describe the same event. The Guardian article demonstrates a manner of 
reporting that simply tells the story rather than attaching a political narrative or 
theatricalizing it through dramatic rhetoric. In this article, reporter Peter Beaumont 
employs the term “attack” when referring to the incident in general, refers to the 
Arab-Israeli attackers as “gunmen” or “attackers” and reports that the Druze 
soldiers “have been shot dead,” (July 14, 2017). This rhetoric stands in stark 
contrast to the biased reporting of both Jewish and Arabic sources. 
       Multiple Arabic news articles discuss the three shooters who killed the Druze 
policemen as if they were “martyrs”.  The word martyr/martyrs, or shaheed/
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shuhada’ in Arabic, is somewhat of a loaded term. Depending on the context, it can 
describe those who are regretfully deceased or religious martyrs who are said to 
serve Islam through acts such as self-immolation. The opening sentence of the 
article published by Al-Quds begins (translated from Arabic to English) with the 
phrase “Three young men were martyred…” (July 14, 2017). In the same article, 
different language is used to describe the deaths of the Druze soldiers. It states 
“...two were killed…” when referring to the fallen Druze soldiers. Al-Quds does 
not describe the event as a whole as a “terrorist attack”; instead, it employs the 
common Arabic media term “gunfire operation,” (July 14, 2017). The Al-Hadath 
article uses the same phraseology as Al-Quds and the specific Arabic word 
shuhada’ to describe the deaths of the Arab-Israeli gunmen, (July 16, 2017). The 
intention behind the use of the word shuhada’ is not fully clear, but the reader can 
infer that the religious connotation is not intended in these articles, making the 
term less contentious. Although the media is not trying to assert that the deceased 
Arab-Israelis were religious martyrs fighting in the name of Islam against Judaism; 
however, it is essential to note that these same articles refer to the deaths of the 
Druze policemen in a different manner. Both Al-Quds and Al-Hadath use the 
Arabic word maqtal al-Druzeen, or “killing of the two Druze.” The Arab-Israelis 
were martyred and the Druze were just killed. 
       Generally, Israeli articles decisively refer to the Arab-Israeli shooters as 
“terrorists” and the event as a whole as an act of terrorism, intending to accuse the 
three Arab-Israeli shooters as agents in the terrorism Israelis claim they suffer at 
the hands of Arabs. The title of Israel Hayom’s report labels the event a “terrorist 
attack.” Throughout this article the Arab-Israeli attackers are referred to mainly as 
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“terrorists” and occasionally as “gunmen,” and the reporters even state, “No 
terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the attack at this time,” leading the 
public to assume that the tragedy was an organized attack on Israel by a hate group 
(July 14, 2017). Though Haaretz’s report takes a less aggressive standpoint than 
that of Israel Hayom, it nevertheless refers to the shooters as “terorrists,” (July 14, 
2017). The article quotes Jewish Police Commissioner Roni Alsheich’s statement 
that blames the attack on “extremist ideology” and files the event under “the war 
on terror,” a term that has taken on an explicitly political connotation since U.S. 
President Bush’s employment of the term following the September 11, 2001, 
attacks (Israel Hayom July 14, 2017). Media use of this term reminds readers of the 
devastating violence the United States experienced in 2001, and comparing the 
shooting of two Druze policemen to the 9/11 attack is an inflammatory 
juxtaposition. The article also quotes one of the deceased Druze officers’ cousins 
comment that the soldiers are “...victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” (Israel 
Hayom July 14, 2017). 
       At face value, the opposing descriptions of the men involved in the tragedy 
represents the extent to which the political views of the two groups are opposed. 
Digging deeper, though, one notices that the reporting of many of the news articles 
is solely focused on the broader political strife between Arab-Israelis and Jews and 
is not concerned with the Druze identity of the deceased. Examination of Israeli 
news sources reveals that Israelis are not focused on the fallen soldiers’ belonging 
to Israel’s Druze community; rather, they are focused on the “terrorist” attacks and 
the supposed victimization of Israelis by Arabs (July 14, 2017). This same article 
along with many others fails to mention that the fallen soldiers belong to the Druze 
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community. This represents the previously-mentioned first category of media 
response for both Arab-Israelis and Jews because they examine the event without 
focusing on the victims’ Druze identity. This category of media leads the reader to 
believe that the deceased Druze are just like all other Israeli security service 
members, implying that Israelis either view the Druze as equals or do not 
appreciate or acknowledge the sacrifice they make to protect their Jewish 
homeland. It also shows that Arab-Israelis group the Druze with other Israelis, 
ignoring that they have a distinct identity. 
Used and Abused 
       An overarching theme found in Arabic media is that Israel is taking advantage 
of the Druze to serve a larger political purpose. One article that falls into the 
second category, that which discusses the deceased as victims, claims that the 
Druze were forced into conscription by the Israeli government despite protests 
made by Druze leaders (Merkez al-Ahram... July 29, 2017). This same article also 
argues that Israel intentionally assigns Druze soldiers to border zones and areas of 
high tension to increase the number of interactions between Druze security forces 
and Arab-Israelis and Palestinians. This further divides the people and heightens 
tension between the two minority groups, giving more power to Israel. This 
supports the idea that IDF service elevates the status of the soldier and, therefore, 
gives Israeli Druze access to societal benefits that Arab-Israelis do not have. 
       The article that does mention the fallen policemen’s Druze identity was 
published by Keren Karemeth Lelsrael Jewish National Fund (September 18, 
2017), which aims to increase resources dedicated to the Druze minority as a 
demonstration of Israel’s commitment to minority groups. The article focuses on 
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Israel’s commitment to their Druze “brothers” and their appreciation of the Druze 
security officers’ allegiance to the state, essentially paying lip service to a political 
narrative that maintains the Druze’s marginal status in Israeli society by praising 
them just enough to imitate inclusion. 
Ignored 
        News articles regarding the shooting were surprisingly scarce. What was not 
scarce, though, were responses to the consequences of the shooting and the larger 
political scene in the area. This demonstrates Arab-Israelis’ and Jews’ indifference 
to the Druze community. The majority of the Arabic media articles focus on 
Muslims’ outrage toward the cancellation of Friday prayers at al-Aqsa mosque 
immediately following the attack and the supplemental security measures, such as 
the addition of metal detectors, Israeli security forces implemented at the mosque. 
This is not necessarily an indication that Arab-Israelis dislike the Druze, but it does 
demonstrate that they have little regard for the Druze as a unique community. Most 
articles make mention that the policemen are from the Druze community but only 
in conjunction with the most basic information needed to complete the articles--the 
names and hometowns of the deceased. Though this does not seem extraordinary, it 
is significant. This implies that they view the Druze policemen the same as any 
other Israeli policemen, which suggests that the Druze--like the Jews--are Arab-
Israelis’ enemy.  
        Jewish articles focus on the so-called “war on terror” that they say 
defines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, using the tragic deaths to further the popular 
political narrative that claims that the normal way of life in Israel is under threat 
from Palestinian aggression, which ignores that the attackers were Arab-Israelis 
!41
and the victims were Druze policemen rather than members from Israel’s majority 
group. While Druze service is appreciated, Israelis largely ignore the 
marginalization of the Druze population. 
Conclusion 
       The Druze are used by both sides as a medium to convey a larger political 
narrative. Both sides use the attack to criticize the incessant Israel-Palestine 
conflict and to demonize their respective enemies (each other). In response to the 
attack and other similar attacks in the past, Arabic sources raise important 
injustices toward the Druze, but they are discussed not in an effort to promote 
equality for the Druze community but to expose the hypocrisy of the Israelis’ 
response to the shootings. On the other hand, Israeli news sources advertise the 
commitment to solidarity made by Netanyahu and other government and 
community leaders, harping on the supposed proclamation of brotherhood between 
the Jews and the Druze. Politicized articles from each side claim to seek justice and 
equality for the Druze; however, the minority community will be forgotten as soon 
as it no longer is useful for political discourse between Arab-Israelis and Jews. 
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CONCLUSION 
       Like many Jewish IDF soldiers, the Druze put service to their country above 
their own lives. Through this solidarity with the Jewish community and the State of 
Israel, the Druze demonstrate their commitment to their fellow citizens and the 
nation that houses them and offers them religious liberty. The sacrifice that the 
Druze offer to the State is clear; however, the benefits Israel offers to them in 
return are less forthright. Their service is the key to Druze inclusion in a 
phenomenon that dominates Israeli society, but it does not fully unlock the door to 
normal Israeli life and full social acceptance. The Druze community remains a 
social pariah that is tucked away in the hills of the Galilee invited to join Israeli life 
only for a short stint of military service. Through their commitment to service, the 
Druze maintain the sacred promise to their Jewish brethren in Israel established 
through the Covenant of Blood, but the Jews seem to remember the pact only when 
necessary to maintain the facade that the agreement is mutual. When a tragedy 
results in the ultimate sacrifice, Jewish media proved that Jews give little more 
than lip service to their oath to the Druze.  
       The Druze have been used by the Jews since before the State of Israel was 
founded. In the 1930s, the relationship between the Druze and the Jews was more 
co-beneficial, though. The relationship was founded upon a minority survival pact 
when the Jews, too, were a minority in the area and were being violently 
persecuted after flooding into the Palestinians’ territory. Post-1948, though, the 
Jews switched from minority to majority, but the Druze maintained their alliance 
with the Jews, even strengthening their commitment to the Jews by making it a 
public pact. The relationship became more exploitative as Israeli society 
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progressed. The Druze maintained their quiet life secluded in their villages, 
venturing down to serve their nation and sacrifice their lives. That the Jews are 
taking advantage of the Druze is not apparent until a tragedy like the al-Aqsa 
shooting in July 2017. After the fatal shooting of the two Druze police offers, 
Jewish media responses offered just enough sympathy to ensure the Druze feel that 
they are making a valuable contribution to Israel’s security forces, but the kind 
words they offer to the fallen officers’ families are simply lip service. 
       Overall, Arabic and Jewish media responses to the incident reflect the 
indifference both sides feel toward the Druze community. The Druze are caught in 
the middle of the larger Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Though Jews consume the vast 
majority of the Israeli population, Arab-Israelis combined with Palestinians make a 
larger community. Because Arabs living inside the borders of Israel sympathize so 
closely with Palestinians, Arab-Israelis feel a similar sense of detachment from the 
Druze, even though they are all Arabs, a link that was forcefully removed from 
memory through Israel’s divide-and-rule policy. The Israelis succeeded in their 
attempt to break the non-Jewish minority into even smaller groups. They further 
succeeded by turning those minorities against one another and ensured that 
relations between the Arab-Israeli and Druze minorities were so hostile that the two 
groups never would unite to fight against the Jews and the State of Israel. Arabic 
media articles’ use of the word “martyr” to describe only the three Arab-Israeli 
shooters and not the fallen Druze policemen demonstrates Arab-Israelis’ sentiments 
toward the Arab-Israeli population and the Druze population. The Arab-Israeli 
shooters were martyrs because they were defending their Arab brethren from the 
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tyranny of Israel. They refer to the deaths of the two Druze as simply a “killing,” 
ignoring that the Druze officers were unexpectedly murdered in the line of duty. 
       Arabic media largely ignores that the victims are police from the Druze 
community, not from the Jewish group they see as their oppressors. Despite Israel’s 
successful attempt to establish a distinct identity for the Druze by establishing a 
new nationality and system of education for the Druze community, Arabic media 
muddles together the Druze with the Jews because they are fighting for the same 
nation that they perceive as oppressive. Druze participation in the IDF and, 
consequently, other branches of security forces like the police allies them with the 
Jews in a concrete fashion. To Arab-Israelis, the IDF gun aimed at their Palestinian 
brothers could just as likely be manned by a Druze soldier as by a Jewish soldier. 
Within the IDF and Israeli society, though, there is a distinct differentiation 
between the Jewish population and the Druze. The Druze look like the Arab-
Israelis and are treated the same by the Jews when met in passing. The Druze are 
not appreciated by the Jewish majority unless they are putting their lives at stake 
for the Jewish cause and the Jewish nation. Druze are excluded by Arab-Israelis 
because they are viewed as the enemy, and they are social pariahs among other 
Israelis because they look different and practice a different religion, leaving the 
Druze neither here nor there, caught in between the hostile struggle between Arabs 
and Israelis. 
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